Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are wireless networks with special characteristic. Due to the absence of the infrastructure [1] , Wireless sensor networks are more convenient than other networks. Though wireless sensor networks have limited bandwidth, low or medium computational capability and energy constraints, their contributions for the situations where communication is needed but there is no infrastructure or infrastructures have been heavily damaged are beyond suspicion.
Security plays an important role in wireless sensor networks architecture. Due to their unique nature, WSN security is challenging in many ways and six common challenges are usually defined: (i) wireless nature of communication, (ii) resource limitation on sensor nodes, (iii) very large and dense WSN, (iv) lack of fixed infrastructure, (v) unknown network topology prior to deployment, (vi) high risk of physical attacks on unattended sensors. In addition to these security challenges, there is a number of unavoidable constraints that have to be taken into account, e.g. power consumption and key management constraints.
Power consumption constraints. The cryptographic algorithms used by security protocols have an important computational cost that must be taken into account and analyzed. Traditionally, it has been considered that the power and energy limitations of usual WSN nodes make the use of public-key cryptosystems impractical. However, this situation has changed in last few years and recent studies show that public-key approaches are now feasible, even in RFID tags. In any case, symmetric-key cryptography and hash functions are still between two and four orders of magnitude faster than digital signatures, in such a way that those procedures become, in our opinion, the most practical choice for protecting WSN communications [2, 3, 20, 21, 22] .
Key management constraints. Despite the several proposals that can be found in the specialized literature on the subject, to date the only practical option for the distribution of keys to sensor node in large-scale WSN is key pre-distribution [4, 5] .
As a result, the security mechanisms used in wireless sensor networks have to be light-weight. Dr. Oscar proposed a light-weight authentication scheme and key management protocol for wireless sensor networks in [6] . They just use symmetric cryptography [7] , and, in particular, un-keyed and keyed-hash functions. Comparing with other schemes such as Giglor protocol [8] , this scheme is so small in the requirements of resources [9] .
In this paper, we show that there are some security flaws in Oscar's light-weight authentication scheme: an attacker and a legitimate sensor node can collude to make the attacker join in the wireless sensor network.
As a suggestion to fix the problem, we present a slight improvement. Our fix does not make serious effect in the efficiency and other features of the original scheme.
Oscar's light-weight authentication scheme

Preliminaries
For reasons of clarity, the symbols used in Oscar's light-weight authentication scheme are listed below: 
Proposed authentication
The solution proposed in this paper involves three phases: key pre-distribution, network initialization and authentication protocol. In key pre-distribution, M k is generated by the network manufacturer and stored in the sensor node temporarily. An ith cycle authenticator i j  is an operator that can be used by a node to authenticate to another. The superscript indicates the cycle in which the authenticator is. We define:
In the network initialization phase, every node generates its unique key,
r is a generated random value. Then i r will be broadcast. After receiving the random values form neighbors, each node calculates its neighbors' encryption keys and stores them in a list. Then each node hashes the master key M k and saves it as the first authentication key,
After that, M k will be deleted for preventing it from be obtaining by attackers. Finishing the above, we see that Table 1 is the memory organization after deployment phase [10] . Each one of these tuples has a state label associated with it [11] , which describes the current state of the tuple in the authentication process [12] [13] . The possible values for this state are:
UNUSED -the tuple has not been yet used. ASSIGNED -the tuple has been temporarily assigned to a node in an in-progress authentication process. The details can be found in the following section. If the process fails, then the state changes to UNUSED and the tuple is available for use again.
USED -the tuple has been used in a successful authentication attempt and is no longer available to other processes. In this way, replay attacks can be avoided.
In addition to these labels, the authenticator structure has another field, called current tuple index, d, which stores the first UNUSED tuple and is incremented by one every time a tuple changes its state from UNUSED to ASSIGNED. An example can be found in Table 2 , which contains the values for a second cycle authenticator. 
UNUSED
In authentication protocol, the proposed authentication scheme shows the process of authentication when a new node wants to join in the wireless sensor networks. The A node is a fresh one, whose authenticator is in the first cycle. Let B be the authenticator node, which can be in any arbitrary jth cycle. The protocol between A and B is then carried out as follows:
1. A produces a challenge for B by generating a random value, A r . Then it sends a message to B as:
B receives 1
M from A and performs the following operations: (a) It opens the first unused tuple, marked by the current tuple index, δ, of its authenticator and it extracts the corresponding random number, B r , and its pair 
Analysis of Oscar's scheme
Though Oscar's scheme takes advantage of hash functions and symmetric encryption to ensure the authentication process safe and reduce the resources the scheme costs, this scheme still have security flaws in authentication protocol phase and resisting a special denial of service (DOS) attack [14] . In the previous literatures, most sources of attacks researchers take into account are malicious and illegitimate entities who we call them attackers. Therefore we lose the sight of the attack actions from internal and legitimate entities. [15] shows that two colluding mobile users can retrieve the long-term secret key of their home server without performing any active attacks. In this way, we can also establish such a model which takes advantage of a colluding attack to make an illegitimate node join in the wireless sensor network [16] .
The same with DOS attacks, Dr. Oscar only takes the external, malicious and illegitimate attackers into account without internal and legitimate nodes. Therefore, we can control a large number of legitimate sensor nodes to execute DOS attacks. Further speaking, the above DOS attack [17] can combine with the compromise under the hash chain to carry out hash chain attacks.
In addition, if an attacker obtains all the privacy information by capturing the sensor node, he can obtain the set of encryption keys of his neighbor nodes. Therefore, the attacker can communicate with neighbor nodes maliciously. This is a serious oversight for the Oscar's scheme. Now, we will detail the above problems in sequence.
A threat model in authentication protocol
In Oscar's paper, the cycle of hash function ensures the security of the authentication protocol phase. That is to say, even though the attacker can capture the sensor node and obtain all the privacy information, he can only obtain the current authentication key and know nothing about which cycle the authenticator is in. But in Oscar's scheme, we can see that the change of authentication key is only performing as   
A special denial DOS attack.
Oscar's scheme only takes the DOS attacks into account whose sources are external, malicious and illegitimate nodes. But the latest literatures reveal that the attacker can execute DOS attack via controlling legitimate sensor nodes. That is to say, attackers can control lots of legitimate nodes and make them send legitimate requests to the target node repeatedly to carry out DOS attacks. In this way, DOS attack is obviously successful. Further speaking, due to take advantage of hash chain in authentication protocol, unavoidably, this scheme has the hash function vulnerability index [17] , which causes the hash chain attack. Though almost every existing hash function has low hash function vulnerability index and hence they are robust against hash chain attacks, in Oscar's scheme, due to the limited length of input and output, considering with the great number of sensor nodes, the hash chain attack can be taken into account.
Improvements
In Oscar's scheme, the change of keys is only performing as
 , which causes the above threat model. As showed in the above, Oscar's scheme ensures the security of sensor nodes valid by employing hash chain. In Oscar's scheme, even if the attacker obtains the current authentication key j auth k , he cannot know what j is. But as showed in section 3, an attacker can make an illegitimate node join into the wireless sensor network without obtaining what j is. Therefore, for resisting this threat model, we present a slightly improvement in the scheme. The total process is summarized as follows:
When node B receives a request from a fresh node A, before replying, it will generate a random value m firstly, then sensor node B will change its key For resisting the above DOS attack, we only need to add a simple authentication scheme into the original mechanism which is established to resist DOS attacks. This authentication scheme only checks whether the received random value i r is equal to some value in the set of encryption of its neighbors. If i r exists in the set, it will not provide service to node i, and it will become available again. Then the sensor node sends a message to center system to report the anomalous actions of node i.
To solve the problem of reveal of the encryption key, we present a new encryption scheme. If node A wants to communicate with node B, it will firstly extract its own encryption key The Oscar's scheme is tested and verified that t can save up to 98% and 67% of the required energy for message transmission by SPINS [18] and BROSK [19] , respectively. The total number of exchanged bits, directly proportional to the final energy consumption, is depicted in Fig. 2 . And our proposal only adds a parameter into the transmission data. Therefore, the energy consumption of our proposal is increased a little that is still less than the previous schemes as showed in Fig. 3 . 
Conclusion
In this paper, we revisited Oscar's light-weight authentication scheme. It mainly uses symmetric cryptography and, in particular, un-keyed and keyed-hash functions. Oscar's scheme meets all the requirements usually defined for sensor networks. Then we show some security flaws in the Oscar's scheme. An attacker can control a legitimate sensor node to make the attacker's illegitimate node join in the wireless sensor network, Oscar's scheme cannot resist a special DOS attack via taking advantage of legitimate sensor nodes and encryption keys of the sensor nodes can be obtained by capturing the node. To fix the above problem, we present some slight improvements. To resist the threat model, we change the way of generation of new authentication key by increasing the times of executing hash function. To resist the special DOS attack, we add a simple authentication into the original mechanism to check whether the received random value exists in the encryption list stored in the sensor node. To resist the reveal of encryption keys, we improve the encryption scheme of communication by changing the generation of session key. Comparing with the computation cost of Oscar's scheme, the computation cost of our scheme increases slightly. Our improvements do not make serious effect in the efficiency, security and other features of the original scheme.
